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ABSTRACT
Over the past few years, massive cyberattacks have dominated the public
imagination. Most Americans have been directly affected by data breaches
and an overwhelming majority believe that they are no longer in control of
their data. At the same time, there are important applications in which the
aggregation of private data is unavoidable. Not surprisingly, there has been
considerable interest in developing protocols for secure multi-party computa-
tion (MPC), i.e., N parties providing private inputs to jointly compute some
function f . Recent developments in MPC have led to leaps in efficiency and
MPC is quickly becoming a practical approach for privacy-centric distributed
applications.
As MPC applications become deployed, guaranteeing the security of these
protocols, even when interacting with other applications, is essential. The
standard approach to showing security of MPC protocols under arbitrary
composition is through the universal composability (UC) framework. There
has been much prior work on this topic; however, most previous work either
makes synchronicity assumptions or does not guarantee output delivery in
the presence of even one fault. For practical MPC applications, though, deal-
ing with asynchronicity and robustness is essential. In this thesis, we describe
two new keywords, eventually and leak, that aid in defining protocols in the
asynchronous world and define wrappers that implement these within the
UC framework. We then use this novel wrapper to give a UC-realization of a
reliable broadcast primitive, by means of Bracha’s classic protocol. Finally,
we define and prove a realization of what we call the smart contract model
of MPC, which serves as a UC-idealization of asynchronous, robust MPC.
Keywords: multiparty computation; cryptographic protocols; universal com-
posability; protocol security
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A multiparty computation (MPC) protocol allows a set of n parties to com-
pute y1 . . . yn = f(x1, . . . , xn) for any function f , with the following restric-
tions: each party Pi learns only their output yi and each party, and any
adversary, learns no other information about inputs and outputs of other
parties. The standard way to define security for MPC protocols is by the
real/ideal-world paradigm. Recent work has done so through the universal
composability (UC) framework [1, 2], which allows for modular analysis of
cryptographic protocols. In this setting, security is defined in terms of an
environment, Z. An experiment is performed, in which Z interacts with
a real-world and an ideal-world protocol. Whereas the real-world protocol
consists of actual communication between parties to perform a joint compu-
tation, the ideal-world protocol is comprised of parties providing inputs to
and receiving outputs from a trusted third party. Informally, we say a real-
world protocol is secure if a simulator, S, exists in the ideal world that can
cause Z to be unable to distinguish between the two worlds. Attacks against
the real-world protocol will then be limited to only those attacks possible
against the ideal-world protocol.
There has been considerable work analyzing the security of protocols in
synchronous networks, where messages are delivered within a known, finite
period of time (see, for example, Katz et al. [3]). Within the MPC context,
Damg˚ard and Nielsen [4] defined an arithmetic black box (ABB) functionality
for the synchronous world, giving an idealization of MPC as a general-purpose
computer. Parties provide inputs to the ABB. The ABB then performs com-
putation securely inside and sends outputs to each party.
Damg˚ard and Nielsen’s ABB depends on synchronous rounds, where par-
ties provide inputs in each round. Synchrony assumptions can be quite un-
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realistic in the real world. Actual network conditions are inconsistent and
delays can have no upper bound. As they capture network unreliability, as-
suming the existence of only asynchronous networks can be more realistic:
in such networks, we assume that the communication network is under the
control of an adversary that can delay delivery of messages arbitrarily but
not infinitely; that is, messages are eventually delivered.
The ABB defined in [4] is not sufficient for asynchronous networks: guar-
antees about parties all being in the same round no longer hold. Waiting for
inputs from every party with a timeout, as ABB does, is infeasible: distin-
guishing between crashed parties and delayed messages isn’t a possibility.
Previous works have defined a limited version of asynchronous MPC called
asynchronous secure function evaluation (ASFE) [5, 6]. However, these func-
tionalities do not extend an ABB to the asynchronous world. For one, ASFE
is one-shot in nature, which means it only captures a single execution of
the functionality. ASFE is also parameterized by a specific function f ; this
means that each function f requires a separate functionality. We wish to
instead construct a reactive functionality for MPC, in which multiple inputs
and outputs are exchanged. This would extend the ABB model of MPC to
the asynchronous setting. Because an ABB can maintain an internal state
between invocations, this would simplify the process of creating modular
constructions of asynchronous MPC protocols: the MPC layer would be ab-
stracted to our functionality.
Before tackling this problem, we first give a new approach to defining
asynchronous protocols in UC. There have been previous approaches at rep-
resenting asynchrony within the universal composability framework. Katz et
al. [3] and Coretti et al. [6] model eventual delivery using a polling mech-
anism. Each party polls each ideal functionality for outputs, decrementing
a delay counter. A causes delay by sending delay to ideal functionalities in
unary format. As A has polynomially-bounded computational power, requir-
ing a unary input limits the total delay on message delivery A can cause.
This provides an indirect approach to eventual delivery: it is a consequence
of the polynomial bound on written messages.
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We find that this standard approach is unappealing for two reasons: (1)
this takes an indirect approach to bounding delay and (2) requiring each
functionality to independently account for activations and delays results in
complicated protocol designs. Instead, we define a wrapper facilitating even-
tual code execution that resolves both of these issues. We additionally illus-
trate its use by proving the UC-security of a classical asynchronous reliable
broadcast protocol due to Bracha [7].
Using this wrapper and drawing inspiration from smart contracts in cryp-
tocurrencies, we define a version of ABB sufficient for the asynchronous
world. We give a realization of this functionality and prove its security in
the UC model.
3
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Overview
This chapter provides some necessary background information to understand
this work. Section 2.2 provides some background related to multiparty com-
putation and Shamir secret sharing-based MPC. Section 2.3 provides some
background related to universal composability and the definition of security
in the UC framework.
2.2 Multiparty Computation
We consider the standard MPC setting of n parties P1, . . . , Pn, where up to
t < n
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parties are corrupted by a Byzantine adversary A. We adopt sev-
eral standard techniques used in Shamir secret-sharing based MPC. We omit
these for brevity, but these can be found in [8, Section 2]. Additionally, we
use the following notation:
Let p be a prime and s ∈ Fp be some secret in the field. Then, [[s]]t denotes
a Shamir secret sharing [9] of threshold t. In particular, let φ : Fp → Fp be
a randomly sampled t-degree polynomial such that φ(0) = s. Then, each Pi
gets a share [[s]]it = φ(i).
2.3 Universal Composability
The universal composability framework of Canetti [1, 2] is based on the
real/ideal-world paradigm. Informally, we define security by showing that
all attacks in the real world, in which parties communicate according to a
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prescribed protocol pi, are limited to only those possible in the ideal world,
in which parties send inputs to and receive outputs from a trusted third party.
Formally, we adopt the standard Interactive Turing Machine (ITM) treat-
ment of protocol execution (see [1, Section 3]). The execution of the real
protocol pi consists of the following Interactive Turing Machines (ITMs): the
parties, P1 . . . Pn; the environment, Z, which represents everything outside
of a protocol execution; and the real-world adversary, A, which describes
the behavior of corrupted parties. The execution of the ideal functionality
F consists of the following ITMs: the dummy parties, D1 . . .Dn, which act
only as channels between Z and F ; the environment, Z; and the ideal-world
adversary (or simulator) S, which can only meaningfully communicate with
F . In this work, we consider static corruptions: before protocol execution
begins, the set of parties controlled by the adversary is fixed. In both worlds,
Z provides inputs to and receives outputs from honest parties, and it can
communicate with the adversary throughout the protocol.
Protocol execution in the ITM model proceeds through activations. The
environment can activate honest parties with input or the adversary with a
message. Honest parties compute local computation when activated and are
able to activate other ITMs by sending them messages. Corrupted parties,
on the other hand, act as pass-through parties for the adversary: the adver-
sary dictates any outgoing messages and incoming messages are routed to it.
There is only one ITM active at any time: once ITM A writes a message
to the tape of ITM B, A becomes inactive and B becomes activated. If an
activation ends without an outgoing message, Z becomes activated. An ex-
ecution ends when Z outputs a single bit.
We now define security in this model. Informally, for any environment Z,
we want this output bit to have the same probability distribution in the real
and ideal worlds: this would mean that, in the view of the environment, the
two worlds are indistinguishable.
More formally, we first consider the execution of the real-world protocol.
Let EXECpi,A,ZREAL (z, r˜) constitute the output of Z in the real world consisting
of interactions with the adversary A and the parties P1, . . . , Pn running pro-
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tocol pi. Here, z is the initial input to Z and r˜ is the set of random tapes
that Z, A, and P1, . . . , Pn have access to. We define EXECpi,A,ZREAL (z) to be the
random variable after choosing r˜ uniformly at random.
Next, we consider the execution of the ideal-world functionality. Let
EXECF ,S,ZIDEAL(z, r˜) constitute the output of Z in the ideal world consisting of
interactions with the ideal-world adversary (or simulator) S and the dummy
parties D1, . . . ,Dn acting as passthroughs between Z and F . Here, z is the
initial input to Z and r˜ is the set of random tapes that Z, S, and F have
access to. We define EXECF ,S,ZIDEAL(z) to be the random variable after choosing
r˜ uniformly at random.
Definition 1 (UC-realization). We say that a protocol Π t-securely UC-
realizes F in the presence of malicious adversaries, if, for all malicious PPT
adversaries A and for all PPT environments Z, there exists a PPT adversary
S, called a simulator, such that
{EXECpi,A,ZREAL (z)}z∈{0,1}∗
c≡ {EXECF ,S,ZIDEAL(z)}z∈{0,1}∗
It is often easier to work with the following definition instead.
Definition 2 (UC-realization, dummy adversary). Let D be the dummy ad-
versary; that is, an ITM that only acts a pass-through between the envi-
ronment and the parties/protocol. We say that a protocol Π t-securely UC-
realizes F in the presence of malicious adversaries, if there exists a PPT
adversary S, called a simulator, such that, for all PPT environments Z,
{EXECpi,D,ZREAL (z)}z∈{0,1}∗
c≡ {EXECF ,S,ZIDEAL(z)}z∈{0,1}∗
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CHAPTER 3
UNIVERSAL COMPOSABILITY
WRAPPER
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we define a new ITM, W , that we call a wrapper. W will
exist in both the real and ideal worlds, and its purpose is increasing the
modularity of protocol design. We define two keywords in this chapter: leak
and eventually. Section 3.2 discusses the notion of protocol leakage in the
UC framework and defines leak. Section 3.3 defines eventually and gives a
new approach to eventual code execution. We note that although we define
these two keywords below separately, they are part of the same wrapper W .
Section 3.4 gives an example of an ideal functionality for atomic broadcast in
the polling and wrapper models of eventual code execution. Section 3.5 uses
the eventually keyword to define eventual delivery point-to-point channels
that can be used in designing asynchronous protocols. Section 3.6 modifies
the definitions of UC-security from Section 2.3 to include the wrapper.
3.2 Protocol Leakage and the Leak Keyword
An adversary can gain information during the course of a protocol. A pro-
tocol designer will naturally try to capture such adversarial leakage, in order
to prove security despite leakage. In the UC framework, the default way
for adversaries to gain information from functionalities is via the backdoor
message mechanism. However, one downside to backdoor messages is that
adversaries are immediately activated. In some situations, this is unwanted.
For example, a functionality can contain both adversarial leakage and an
eventually codeblock - if one of these calls activated the functionality im-
mediately, the adversary could prevent the other from being called by not
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Wleak
Initialize: leaks← ∅1
On input (LEAK, msg) from a functionality F :2
Append msg to leaks3
On input (READ,) from A:4
Pop all elements of leaks and send to A5
Figure 3.1: Leakage Keyword
returning control. In some cases though, we need the adversary to gain im-
mediate control, as in the advance mechanism defined later in Figure 3.2.
We do this by distinguishing a send command, which immediately sends a
message to A, and a leak command, which adds messages to a queue to be
later retrieved by A. When a functionality calls leak msg, this is translated
to a message (LEAK,msg) for the wrapper and handled as defined in Figure
3.1.
3.3 Eventual Code Execution and the Eventually
Keyword
We consider an asynchronous network in which the adversary has complete
control over message delivery. Katz et al. [3] and Coretti et al. [6] both
achieve eventual delivery by requiring A to provide delays in unary format.
Although this does achieve eventual delivery, it does so in an unsatisfying
manner, as a consequence of unary messages. Additionally, these function-
alities do not themselves allow for eventual code execution, a more general
concept in which code, rather than messages, must be executed at the will
of the adversary. Instead, in the unary delay/fetch model of eventual code
execution, each functionality must independently handle adversarial delays
and party fetches, as in the asynchronous Byzantine agreement functionality
of Coretti et al. [6].
Eventual code execution is essential to many natural distributed systems
tasks in the asynchronous world. One example is atomic broadcast. Defined
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in Figure 3.7, the atomic broadcast primitive guarantees that all inputs from
a set of fixed parties are appended to a totally ordered distributed log. How-
ever, the only guarantee is that inputs must eventually enter the log; atomic
broadcast does not provide deterministic guarantees on when this happens.
Requiring each asynchronous functionality to independently handle fetches
and delays results in complicated functionality and protocol structures. This
reduces clarity of protocols and modularity of designs. In brief, protocol de-
signers end up needing to focus on ancillary details instead of on the main
purpose of a protocol.
We use a different approach and define an eventually keyword that allows
for arbitrarily delayed code execution. The most recent [1] version of the UC
framework defines computation bounds in terms of a new construct called
import. In our wrapper, we directly related delay to import. Contrasting
with A writing unary strings to a functionality’s tape, we require A to pro-
vide equal amounts of delay and import to the wrapper. An adversary must
therefore “give up” compute power in order to cause delays. Although we do
not explicitly deal with this in our proofs later, one benefit of this approach
is that UC security proofs must be more explicit in verifying the polynomial
run-time of simulators.
We also replace the mechanism of parties sending fetch messages. Instead,
we define an eventually wrapper, as in Figure 3.2, in which Z directly provides
advance messages toW . This replaces the polling mechanism in previous ap-
proaches with a centralized one with Z. This simplifies functionality design
by no longer requiring functionalities themselves to explicitly handle polling.
In order to keep this construct meaningful, we only consider those environ-
ments that provide sufficiently many advance messages for all code in the
wrapper to execute.
We note that the wrapper in Figure 3.2 does not execute code internally;
rather, it only stores functions and arguments in a queue. When a function
and arguments pair is popped from the queue, W forwards these to the rel-
evant functionality. The functionality itself will then execute the function.
This avoids any complexities with properly accounting for import, simplifying
run-time analysis. To reduce redundancy, we note that every functionality
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using the eventually wrapper implicitly contains the handler defined in Fig-
ure 3.3. This handler ensures that functions popped from the eventual queue
are executed by functionalities.
WEventually
Initialize delay← 0, runqueue← ∅1
On input (EVENTUALLY, func, args, leakmsg) from functionality F :2
Append (func, args, F) to runqueue3
Leak (F , func.name, leakmsg)4
delay← delay + 15
Send (OK, ) to F6
On input (ADVANCE, ), 1 t from Z7
If |runqueue| > 0 and delay == 0:8
Pop (func, args, F) from runqueue9
Send (func, args) to F10
Else:11
delay← max(delay − 1, 0)12
Send (ADVANCE, ) to A13
On input (EXECUTE, idx) from A:14
Remove runqueue[idx] as (func, args, F)15
Send (func, args) to F16
On input (DELAY,T), T t from A:17
delay← delay + T18
Send (OK, ) to A19
Figure 3.2: Eventual code execution wrapper
On input (func, args) from W :1
Execute func with args2
Figure 3.3: Implicit wrapper message handler
In order to aid in clarity of presentation, we often use the notation from
Figure 3.4 for the eventually keyword. The anonymous function represented
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Leak leakmsg and Eventually :1
{codeblock e}2
Figure 3.4: Simplified notation for eventually
FPi,PjAsync
On input m from Pi:1
Eventually : send m to Pj2
Figure 3.5: Asynchronous Network Functionality
by e, along with leakmsg, are passed to W . A functionality can choose to
provide no leak message when calling an eventually. In that case, it can omit
the leakage part of Figure 3.4 and leakmsg defaults to ⊥. Although we omit
reference to arguments in this notation, any local variables in scope of the
codeblock definition will implicitly be passed to the wrapper as arguments.
3.4 Eventual Message Delivery
The UC framework does not include point-to-point channels or network ab-
stractions directly within the model. Instead, functionalities can be designed
to adequately capture necessary properties of message communication. Pre-
vious approaches to eventual delivery relied on the fetch mechanism (see
FED-SMT in [3, Section 3.2] and FA-SMT in [6, Section 3]). A major draw-
back to these functionalities is that they must explicitly handle everything
we abstract to W ; as such, they become very complicated. Once we define
the eventually keyword, however, writing the functionality for an eventual
delivery point-to-point channel becomes straightforward, as we see in Figure
3.5.
Throughout this work, we use the shorthand Pi sends m to Pj to mean Pi
sends m to FPi,PjAsync.
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3.5 Atomic Broadcast
Atomic broadcast is a type of message broadcast in which all honest parties
must output messages in the same order. This is an important distributed
systems primitive, and there has been considerable work building and analyz-
ing such protocols to achieve it. For an example of an asynchronous atomic
broadcast protocol, see Miller et al. [10].
Traditionally, atomic broadcast is given a property-based definition (see
[10, Definition 1]). We now two UC-style definitions below for functionalities
capturing the essence of atomic broadcast: Figure 3.6 gives a definition using
the traditional polling mechanism and Figure 3.7 gives a definition using our
new model of eventual code execution. We note that these functionalities are
not precisely equivalent, but are UC definitions tailored for the mechanisms
used.
The atomic broadcast functionality in the fetch model contains consider-
able fluff: this is necessary to handle delays and capture the properties of
atomic broadcast. When using the eventually keyword with the wrapper,
however, the functionality delegates all of these tasks to the wrapper and the
goal of the functionality is immediately apparent.
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FAtomic
Initialize: BC← ∅, inputs← ∅, D1, . . . ,Dn ← 0, pos1, . . . , posn ← 01
On input tx from Pi = (sid,pid):2
Append tx to inputs3
Send tx to A4
On input (FETCH,) from Pi = (sid,pid):5
If Di > 0: Di ← Di − 16
Else if posi < |BC|: posi ← posi + 17
Else if posi == |BC|:8
Pop tx from inputs9
If tx 6= ⊥, append tx to BC and set posi ← posi + 110
Send BC[1 : posi] to Pi11
On input (DELAY, Pi, T) from A:12
If T is in unary notation: Di ← Di + T13
Send (OK, ) to A14
On input (APPEND, idx) from A:15
Remove inputs[idx] as tx16
Append tx to BC17
Send (OK, ) to A18
Figure 3.6: Atomic broadcast using the fetch mechanism
FAtomic
Initialize: BC← ∅1
On input tx from Pi = (sid,pid):2
Leak (tx, Pi) and Eventually :3
Append tx to BC4
pos← |BC|5
For each Pj:6
Leak (pos, Pj) and Eventually : send BC[1 : pos] to Pj7
Figure 3.7: Atomic broadcast using eventually
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3.6 UC Security Using the Wrapper
We now give a modified definition of UC-security with the included wrapper.
Consider the execution of the real-world protocol. Let EXECpi,D,W,ZREAL (z, r˜)
constitute the output of Z in the real world consisting of interactions with
the dummy adversary adversary D, the wrapper W , the parties P1, . . . , Pn
running protocol pi. Here, z is the initial input to Z and r˜ is the set of random
tapes that Z and P1, . . . , Pn have access to. We define EXECpi,D,W,ZREAL (z) to be
the random variable after choosing r˜ uniformly at random.
Next, consider the execution of the ideal-world functionality. Let
EXECF ,S,W,ZIDEAL (z, r˜) constitute the output of Z in the ideal world consisting
of interactions with the ideal-world adversary (or simulator) S, the wrapper
W , and the dummy parties D1, . . . ,Dn acting as passthroughs between Z
and F . Here, z is the initial input to Z and r˜ is the set of random tapes that
Z, S, and F have access to. We define EXECF ,S,W,ZIDEAL (z) to be the random
variable after choosing r˜ uniformly at random.
UC-security now consists of the following definition:
Definition 3 (UC-realization, wrapper). We say that a protocol Π t-securely
UC-realizes F in the presence of malicious adversaries, if there exists a PPT
adversary S, called a simulator, such that, for all PPT environments Z,
{EXECpi,D,W,ZREAL (z)}z∈{0,1}∗
c≡ {EXECF ,S,W,ZIDEAL (z)}z∈{0,1}∗
Although we do not give a proof, all theorems from Canetti [1] extend to
our setting with wrapper W .
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF BRACHA BROADCAST
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, we demonstrate the use of eventually keyword in UC proofs,
by proving the security of Bracha’s classical asynchronous reliable broadcast
protocol in the UC framework. Section 4.2 gives a traditional definition of
asynchronous reliable broadcast. Section 4.3 defines an ideal functionality for
asynchronous reliable broadcast. It also gives a representation of Bracha’s
protocol in the UC framework, and constructs a simulator, ultimating proving
the security of Bracha’s protocol.
4.2 Property-Based Reliable Broadcast
Reliable broadcast is an important primitive that forms the basis of nearly
every asynchronous application. In an instance of reliable broadcast, we
consider a fixed set of n parties in which a dealer D sends a message m to all
other parties, and parties try to agree on the dealer’s input. Traditionally, a
single instance of reliable broadcast is required to satisfy the following two
properties:
• If the dealer D is honest, then all honest parties will eventually output
the same message m
• If the dealer D is dishonest, then either (1) all honest parties eventually
output the same message m′ or (2) no honest party outputs a message
There is considerable distributed systems literature around asynchronous
reliable broadcast. The first reliable broadcast to achieve the optimal t = n/3
corruptions threshold is a classical protocol due to Bracha [7]. Security for
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this protocol is shown by Bracha by proving the properties given above.
4.3 UC Security of Bracha Broadcast
As an illustration of the eventually keyword, we now give a proof of security
for Bracha’s broadcast protocol in the UC framework. We first define an
ideal functionality for reliable broadcast in Figure 4.1, succinctly capturing
the required properties of a reliable broadcast protocol.
FRBC
On input tx from dealer D:1
Leak (SENT, D, tx)2
For each Pi:3
Leak (Pi, tx) and Eventually : send tx to Pi4
If D is corrupt, send (OK, ) to D5
Figure 4.1: Reliable broadcast functionality
We additionally write the Bracha broadcast protocol in the UC framework
in Figure 4.2 - note that this protocol is implicitly in the hybrid world con-
sisting of n(n− 1)Fasync pairwise communication channels.
We use the following two lemmas from [7] to prove UC security for ΠBracha:
Lemma 1 ([7, Lemma 3]). Consider an execution of the protocol ΠBracha with
up to t < n
3
corruptions. If an honest party outputs a value tx, then every
other honest party will eventually output tx as well.
Lemma 2 ([7, Lemma 4]). Consider an execution of the protocol ΠBracha with
up to t < n
3
corruptions. If the dealer is an honest party and broadcasts tx,
then every honest party will eventually output tx.
We prove the security of ΠBracha in a hybrid setting where each party Pi
has access to a point-to-point channel FAsynci,j to every other party Pj. It
is sufficient to prove security of ΠBracha against the dummy adversary D [1,
16
ΠBracha
Participants: Parties {P1, . . . Pn}, of which one assumes the role of
dealer D
1
2
define BQ← dn+t
2
e ← a byzantine quorum3
As Dealer:4
On input tx from Z:5
For each Pi: send (VAL, tx) to Pi6
As Recipient:7
On input (VAL, tx) from D or8
(ECHO, tx) from BQ parties or
(READY, tx) from BQ-t parties:
For each Pi: send (ECHO, tx) to Pi9
On input (ECHO, tx) from BQ parties or10
(READY, tx) from BQ-t parties:
For each Pi: send (READY, tx) to Pi11
On input (READY, tx) from BQ parties:12
Output tx13
Figure 4.2: Bracha broadcast protocol
Section 4.3.1]. We show this by constructing an ideal world adversary (or
simulator) S such that the environment Z cannot distinguish its transcript
in the real world and the ideal world. Specifically, in our setting, Z should
not be able to distinguish interacting with the parties P1 . . . Pn, D, and the
eventual code execution wrapper W in the real world and interacting with
dummy parties D1 . . . Dn, S, and W in the ideal world.
We construct a simulator SBracha as in Figure 4.3. We must verify that
SBracha causes the environment Z to be unable to distinguish the joint view
of the interfaces with the adversary, the wrapper W , and parties in the ideal
world versus those in the real world. We prove Lemmas 3 and 4 first, from
which Theorem 1 follows.
First, let us state and prove a lemma related to the delay ofW in the ideal
world:
Lemma 3. Consider the ideal world consisting of Z, SBracha, the dummy
parties D1 . . . Dn, W, and FABB. For every n > 0, at the nth activation of
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Z, the runqueue in W is empty or the delay in W is non-zero.
Proof. We prove this by induction.
First, consider the case of Z’s first activation. By definition, runqueue is
empty and the lemma holds for n = 1.
We now let n > 0. We show that, assuming the statement holds for all
activations in [1, n], it also holds for activation n+ 1. On its nth activation,
Z wrote a message to the tape of SBracha, dummy party Di, or W . We show
that, in each case, the lemma holds for activation n+ 1:
• Z wrote to SBracha: This activation does not affect the runqueue or delay
of W , and the lemma holds for the (n+ 1)th activation of Z.
• Z wrote to Di: As Di is a dummy party, the message is routed to the
ideal functionality. By definition of FRBC and by lines 2-6 of Figure 3.2,
runqueue is extended for outputs. However, delay is also incremented
and becomes non-zero. Thus the lemma holds for the (n+ 1)th activa-
tion of Z.
• Z wrote to W : The only message Z can write to W is ADVANCE.
By lines 7-13 of Figure 3.2, since we know that either the runqueue is
empty or the delay is non-zero, we know that the delay is decremented,
if possible, and SBracha is activated. By lines 4-9 and 15-20 of Figure
4.3, and in particular lines 17-18, a DELAY message is sent to W if
delay becomes 0 with a non-empty runqueue. This increments delay
and makes it non-zero.
We argue that this last step, where S increments delay, is always pos-
sible, even though the wrapper is structured such that infinite delay is
impossible. The reason for this is as follows: if runqueue is non-empty,
then it means that either (1) an honest party input a value to FRBC or
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(2) S, in lines 24-27 of Figure 4.3, instructed a corrupt party input in
response to an honest output. In case (1), all honest parties in ΠBracha
eventually output, as given in Lemma 1. In case (2), all honest parties
in ΠBracha eventually output, as given in Lemma 2. Since S internally
emulates ΠBracha and must only cause delay until all simulated honest
parties finish outputting, and all simulated honest parties eventually
output, delay will not occur indefinitely. S is thus able to instruct W
to increment delay whenever it becomes 0. Thus, the lemma holds for
the (n+ 1)th activation of Z.
In all cases, we have that the lemma holds for the (n + 1)th activation of
Z, and the lemma holds for all n.
We now show the following lemma, comparing the internal simulation of
the real world to the actual real world protocol execution, as well as compar-
ing the transcript of Z in both worlds.
Lemma 4. Consider the real world consisting of Z, D, P1, . . . , Pn, n(n− 1)
FAsync functionalities, and W. Consider the ideal world consisting of Z,
SBracha, D1, . . . , Dn, FRBC, and W. In particular, in both worlds, we consider
the same Z activated with the same input z and same randomness r˜. Then,
for all k > 0, on the kth activation of Z, the following two statements hold:
i. Either (1) k > 1 and in activation k−1, Z wrote a message to Di/Pi or
(2) the state of D, P1, . . . , Pn, the n(n− 1) FAsync functionalities, and
W in the real world and within SBracha’s simulation in the ideal world
are identical.
ii. Z is activated by the same message in both worlds
Proof. We prove this by mutual induction on the two statements.
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First, consider k = 1. On Z’s first activation, the simulated and actual
real worlds are both in their initialized states, so (i) holds. Additionally, as
Z is initialized with the same input z in both worlds, (ii) trivially holds for
both worlds. So (i) and (ii) in the lemma hold for k = 1.
Now let k > 1. We consider Z’s kth activation and assume (i) and (ii)
hold for all k′ < k.
On Z’s (k − 1)th activation, Z wrote a message m to the tape of either
W , S/A, or Di/Pi. By the inductive hypothesis on (ii), we know that the
transcript of Z is the same in both worlds, up to activation k − 1. As Z’s
randomness, r˜, is fixed, the behavior of Z is completely deterministic. This
means that Z wrote the same m to the same ITM in both worlds.
We now consider, in turn, each ITM to which Z could write a message in
activation k − 1, and show that (i) holds for k in each:
• Z wrote to W in activation k − 1: Consider the ideal-world wrapper.
We know by Lemma 3 that either runqueue is empty or delay is non-
zero. In either case, on an ADVANCE by Z, W activates SBracha by line
13 of Figure 3.2.
In the ideal world, we know, by the inductive hypothesis on (i), that
one of two cases is true for activation k − 1:
– k > 2 and Z wrote to Di/Pi in activation k − 2. But by lines
4-9 of Figure 4.3, all leaks are fetched and any inputs to FRBC
are sent to simulated real-world parties. This causes the actual
and simulated real-worlds to be identical, up to the point of an
ADVANCE message. By line 20 of Figure 4.3, SBracha then forwards
this message to the simulated wrapper, causing the simulated and
actual real-worlds to remain identical when SBracha returns control
to Z for its kth activation. Thus (i) holds for k.
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– The states were identical at activation k−1. Thus, after receiving
the forwarded message from W , by line 21, SBracha forwards this
message to the simulated wrapper. This causes the simulated and
actual real-worlds to remain identical when SBracha returns control
to Z for its kth activation. Thus (i) holds for k.
• Z wrote to S/A in activation k−1: In the ideal world, we know, by the
inductive hypothesis on (i), that one of two cases is true at activation
k − 1:
– k > 2 and Z wrote to Di/Pi in activation k − 2. By lines 4-9 of
Figure 4.3, all leaks are fetched and any inputs to FRBC are sent
to simulated real-world parties. This causes the actual and simu-
lated real-worlds to be identical to the point where the adversary
receives a message. By lines 10-14 of Figure 4.3, SBracha causes
the simulated real world to have the same state as the actual real
world. So when SBracha returns control to Z for its kth activation,
the simulated and actual real worlds contain the same state and
(i) holds for k.
– The states were identical at activation k−1. By lines 10-14 of Fig-
ure 4.3, SBracha causes the simulated real world to have the same
state as the actual real world. Thus, when SBracha returns control
to Z for its kth activation, the simulated and actual real worlds
contain the same state and (i) holds for k.
• Z wrote to Di/Pi in activation k − 1: Then (i) holds for k, as the first
case is met.
Having shown that (i) holds for k, we now show that (ii) also holds for
k. Because (i) holds for k, we know that either (1) Z wrote to Di/Pi in
activation k − 1 or (2) the simulated and actual real worlds are identical at
activation k. We show that in both cases, Z is activated by the same message
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in activation k:
(1) Z wrote to Di/Pi in activation k − 1: In the real world, Z writes to
Pi. Pi executes lines 4-6 of Figure 4.2 in FRBC, which are implicit calls
to FAsync functionalities. These, in turn, call W to append scheduled
eventual deliveries. Pi ends its activation with no outgoing message.
In the ideal world, Z writes to Di. Di forwards its input to FRBC,
which performs eventually schedules and ends its activation with no
outgoing message. In both worlds, as activations end without outgoing
messages, Z is automatically invoked with no incoming message. Thus
(ii) holds for k.
(2) The simulated and actual real worlds are identical at activation k: In
the actual real world, Z can receive a message from D or honest par-
ties. By (i), the simulated real world, SBracha receives the same message
from its internal simulation. We consider these cases separately:
– Output from D: By line 21 of Figure 4.3, messages from the simu-
lated dummy adversary are forwarded just as they are in the real
world - so (ii) holds for k in the case of outputs from D.
– Output from simulated Pi: Suppose the dealer is honest. Then
an honest dummy party Dj will already have provided an input
to FRBC and SBracha will already have retrieved it earlier by lines
4-9 of Figure 4.3. By Lemma 2, every honest party will eventually
output the same value. In particular, Pi will output what was
input by Dj and because of the definition of FRBC,W will contain
this value. By lines 29 and 30 of Figure 4.3, S instructs W to
deliver this value to the real-world Pi and (ii) holds for k for an
honest dealer.
Suppose the dealer is dishonest. If no honest parties have output
a value yet, by lines 24-28, SBracha instructs a corrupt party to
input this to FRBC, and instructs delivery to Pi with lins 29 and
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30. If an honest party Pj has already output a value, we know by
Lemma 1 that every honest party will eventually output the same
value. In particular, we know that Pi output the same value that
Pj had output. Because these are the same, SBracha can instruct an
output through lines 29 and 30 and (ii) holds for k for a dishonest
dealer as well.
Having exhausted all cases, we have shown that (ii) holds for k. Therefore,
the lemma holds for all k.
In order to show UC security, i.e., that ΠBracha UC-realizes FRBC, we now
show that Lemma 4 implies Theorem 1:
Theorem 1. Protocol ΠBracha securely realizes FRBC in the Fn(n−1)Async -hybrid
model, in the presence of a static adversary corrupting up to t parties for
t < n
3
Proof of Theorem 1. By (ii) of Lemma 4, we have that, for a fixed Z with
fixed input and randomness, Z receives the same order of activations and
messages in both worlds. Since Z is deterministic once randomness is fixed,
this means that the output of Z will be identical in both worlds. More
specifically, we have that, for all Z, for all z, and for all r˜, EXECF ,S,W,ZIDEAL (z, r˜)
is equal to EXECpi,D,W,ZREAL (z, r˜). But this is the same as saying that the two
probability ensembles {EXECpi,D,W,ZREAL (z)}z∈{0,1}∗ and {EXECF ,S,W,ZIDEAL (z)}z∈{0,1}∗
are identical, giving UC security by Definition 3.
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SBracha
Simulate parties P′1, . . . ,P
′
n running protocol Π
′
Bracha, n(n−1) Fasync
point-to-point channels, dummy adversary D′, and wrapper W ′
1
2
Init runqueue← ∅, delay← 0, tx← ⊥3
On each activation while tx == ⊥:4
Send (READ, ) to W and receive leaks5
If there are leaks, because of definition of FRBC :6
Set tx using (SENT, dealer, tx)← leaks[0]7
Append leaks[1 : n] to runqueue and set delay← delay + n8
Instruct simulated dealer to input m to Π′Bracha9
On input (WRITE, Pi, msg) from Z:10
If Pi is corrupt:11
Send message to D′, instructing D′ to forward msg to P′i12
On input (WRITE, W , msg) from Z:13
Send msg to W ′14
On input (ADVANCE,) from W :15
delay← max(delay − 1, 0)16
If delay = 0 and runqueue is not empty:17
Send (DELAY, 1), 1 t to W and receive (OK, ) back from W18
delay← 119
Send (ADVANCE,), 1 t to W ′20
On input msg from D′:21
Send msg to Z22
On input tx′ from P′i:23
If tx 6= ⊥:24
tx← tx′25
Send message to a corrupt party, directing it to send tx to FRBC26
Send (READ, ) to W and receive leaks27
Append leaks[1 : n] to runqueue28
Pop runqueue[idx] related to delivering msg to Pi29
Send (EXECUTE, idx) to W30
Figure 4.3: Simulator for the Bracha broadcast protocol
24
CHAPTER 5
ASYNCHRONOUS ARITHMETIC BLACK
BOX
5.1 Overview
This chapter gives a model of asynchronous, robust MPC in the UC frame-
work. Section 5.2 summarizes previous UC formalisms of MPC. Section 5.3
defines the smart contract model of MPC, giving UC-style definitions of the
protocol and ideal functionality. Section 5.4 provides a proof of UC security
for our construction.
5.2 Background and Motivation
Universal composability is the standard framework for proving security of
MPC protocols. Damg˚ard and Nielsen [4] defines an arithmetic black box
(ABB) for synchronous MPC. It defines an ideal functionality for MPC by
treating it as a general-purpose computer. Parties can privately provide in-
puts to the ABB, securely compute any arithmetic function within it, and
privately receive outputs from it.
The ABB defined in [4] is not sufficient for asynchronous networks. It
proceeds in synchronous rounds, and expects inputs from all parties in each
round. However, this is unrealizable in an asynchronous setting as it is im-
possible to distinguish between crashed parties and messages in transit.
Cohen [5] and Coretti et al. [6] provide idealizations of a weaker form of
MPC called asynchronous secure function evaluation, in which a functionality
only computes a specific function. ASFE is weaker than ABB as an ABB
functions as a general-computer with multiple inputs and outputs, accepting
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arbitrary computation. Although this is sufficient for simple MPC protocols,
this is not a sufficient abstraction for more complicated MPC protocols, such
as those in the client-server model of MPC. In such protocols, being able to
use ABB as a building block is important: it increases modularity of protocol
design and abstracts any complexity related to arbitrary composition.
5.3 Smart Contract Model of MPC
We use a new approach, drawing inspiration from smart contracts. In cryp-
tocurrencies like Ethereum [11], participants collectively build a distributed
ledger, called a blockchain, consisting of both transactions and smart con-
tracts. Smart contracts specify a set of rules defining the execution of some
function. Transactions can send inputs to smart contracts and cause state
transitions to occur. This is very similar to the MPC context. In asyn-
chronous MPC, for example, a common rule is a protocol waiting for n − t
inputs to perform a computation. Instead of our MPC protocol dictating spe-
cific rules for computation to occur, we instead allow protocol participants
to specify any rules directly in contracts and send inputs to those contracts.
We define a functionality FABB in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 that represents this.
Internally, FABB maintains a totally ordered log of inputs and contracts, and,
much like a general-purpose computer, as contracts specify transitions, FABB
performs them.
We now comment on a few design choices made in FABB:
First, because FABB is a reactive functionality, it informs parties as input-
s/contracts are defined and as outputs are produced. However, this cannot
be done naively. For example, we cannot define a functionality that simply
eventually sends each input and output to each Pi. The reason for this is
as follows: such an ideal functionality, through the dummy parties, would
only be able to write one message at a time to Z. Since we draw inspira-
tion from cryptocurrencies, the real-world protocol will naturally rely on the
atomic broadcast functionality FAtomic as given in Figure 3.7. However, by
line 9 of Figure 3.7, FAtomic can deliver multiple inputs to a party at once. A
real-world protocol would accordingly generate multiple messages for Z. Z
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FABB
Initialize BC ← ∅, outputs ← ∅, last1 ← 0, . . . , lastn ← 0, vals ← ∅,
msgs1 ← ∅, . . . ,msgsn ← ∅
1
2
On initialization: for each Pi, Eventually: Execute deliver(Pi)3
On input (INPUT, x, contract id) from Pi:4
Leak (INPUT, contract id,Pi)5
Eventually :6
k ← number of previous inputs by D already included in BC7
vals[(Pi, k + 1)]← x8
Append (VAR, (Pi, k + 1), contract id, |BC|) to BC and get pos9
C ← contract associated with contract id10
Input ((Pi, k + 1), x) to C and for each action in C, perform action11
Execute GenOutputs(pos)12
Leak OUTPUTS, outputs13
Send (OK, ) to A14
On input (CONTRACT, C) from Pi:15
Leak (CONTRACT, C,Pi) to A16
Eventually :17
k ← number of contracts appended to BC18
contract id← k + 119
Append (CONTRACT, C, contract id, |BC|) to BC and get pos20
Execute GenOutputs(pos)21
Send (OK, ) to A22
GenOutputs(pos):23
For all Pi: Leak (Pi, pos) and Eventually :24
If pos ≤ lasti: return25
For (out, pos′) in outputs where lasti < pos′ ≤ pos:26
Eventually append out to msgsi27
lasti ← pos28
Append BC[lasti + 1 : pos] to msgsi29
Send (OK, ) to A30
Deliver(Pi):31
Leak (Pi) and Eventually execute Deliver(Pi)32
If |msgsi| > 0: pop all elems of msgsi and send to Pi33
Figure 5.1: Asynchronous arithmetic black box functionality
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FABB (continued)
Execution of action, given pos and contract C, with label contract id:1
(type, vars)← C2
If type is of LIN COMB:3
(coeffs = [a0, . . . , an], in vals = [1, x1, . . . , xn], sum label)← vars4
(sum label, coeffs.in vals)→ C5
If type is of MULT:6
(factor1 val, factor2 val, prod label)← vars7
(prod label, factor1 val ∗ factor2 val)→ C8
If type is of OUTPUT:9
(out label, out val)← vars10
Append (OUTPUT, (contract id, out label), out val, pos) to outputs11
(OUTPUT, out label)→ C12
Figure 5.2: Asynchronous ABB action execution
would then trivially distinguish between the ideal and real worlds: a multiple
message output would only happen in the real world. It follows that FABB
must have a mechanism to deliver multiple messages to each Pi. This would
allow ideal-world parties to forward multiple messages at once to Z. As seen
in lines 27 and 29 of Figure 5.1, each possible message is eventually appended
to a list for each party Pi. Then, per the deliver function defined in lines
31-33, this entire list is eventually output to Pi.
Another aspect we take care to design is the order in which outputs are
generated - a party should not receive an output y before receiving defini-
tion messages for any input x that y depends on. This keeps outputs from
FABB meaningful temporally. FABB ensures this in lines 27 and 29 of the
GenOutputs function in Figure 5.1.
Finally, we quickly describe how MPC contracts are defined in our proto-
col. We want the design of contracts to be as general as possible. We require
them to have an interface compatible with FABB in Figure 5.2, but otherwise
allow the contracts to act as a black box. Specifically, contracts store vari-
ables internally and must output state transitions to be performed by FABB
or parties. We require contracts to have the following property: for a given
sequence of variable definitions in a contract, the contract must always give
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the same sequence of outputs. The reason for this is the following: in the
ideal functionality, contracts operate on actual values, whereas in the real
functionality, each party will input secret shares to a contract. Contracts
therefore should not branch on specific values of variables or use any inter-
nal randomness. State transitions that contracts output can be one of three
types: linear combinations, multiplications, or outputs. Each behaves as the
following:
• Linear combinations: The contract must output coefficients for the lin-
ear combination, values stored in the contract that must be linearly
combined, and a label into which the sum must be stored. This is seen
in line 4 of Figure 5.2.
• Multiplications: The contract must output values of the two factors
and a label into which the product should be stored, as in line 7 of
Figure 5.2.
• Outputs: The contract must output the label and value for what should
be publicly reconstructed, as in line 9 of Figure 5.2. Note that, in this
protocol, we only discuss public reconstructions. However, handling
private reconstructions only requires a simple change.
We now give a real-world instantiation of FABB. We follow the standard
online/offline paradigm of MPC protocols. For the offline phase, we define
FOffline in Figure A.1. FOffline represents standard elements used in MPC,
generally generated during preprocessing: random sharings used to hide in-
puts and random triples used for Beaver’s trick in secret share multiplication.
For the online phase, drawing inspiration from blockchains, we use the func-
tionality for atomic broadcast given in Figure 3.7 as a backbone for how the
MPC protocol progresses. Parties send their inputs to FAtomic and they will
eventually be included in a shared totally ordered log.
We define the online phase protocol, ΠOnline, in Figure A.2. When parties
receive inputs values from Z, these are hidden using sharings from FOffline
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and passed directly into FAtomic, as in lines 2-4 of Figure A.2. When parties
receive contracts to broadcast, these are directly send to FAtomic in line 6.
As parties receive inputs and contracts from FAtomic, they are handled using
the class ContractHandler, defined in Figures A.3 and A.4. Parties create a
new ContractHandler for each contract appended to their log, and they pass
inputs and protocol messages directly into them. This is seen in lines 12-25 of
Figure A.2. These handlers process these inputs and messages, and perform
transitions as defined in contracts.
We now explain how ContractHandler works. As mentioned before, given
the same order of inputs, contracts are required to give the same order of
state transitions. The reason for that becomes apparent in the definition of
ContractHandler. In order to keep all parties coordinated, ContractHandler
inputs values one at a time, as seen in lines 2-7 in Figure A.4, and a handler
for a contract only performs one transition at a time.
Transitions are resolved inside of these handlers using standard techniques
from Shamir secret sharing. Linear combinations are handled as in lines 9-12
of Figure A.4 - secret shares are simply linear combined together according
to the defined coefficients. For multiplications, we use random triples from
FOffline to perform Beaver’s trick for multiplication. This is shown in lines
13-29 of Figure A.4. Finally, we perform public reconstructions, as defined in
lines 30-40 of Figure A.4, by having all parties send their shares to all other
participants and use Robust-Interpolate from [8] to reconstruct outputs. Al-
though our protocol does not rely on batch reconstruction or demonstrate
private reconstruction for simplified presentation, the security of ΠOnline, as
shown later, will still hold after modifications to handle those.
5.4 UC Security of Asynchronous ABB
As established previously, it is sufficient to prove security of ΠOnline against
the dummy adversary D [1, Section 4.3.1]. We construct a simulator SABB
in Figures A.5, A.6, and A.7. We must verify that SABB causes the environ-
ment Z to not be able to distinguish its interactions in the real world from
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those of the ideal world. Specifically, in our setting, Z should not be able
to distinguish its interactions with the parties P1 . . . Pn, D, and the eventual
code execution wrapper W in the real world from those interactions in the
ideal world with dummy parties D1 . . . Dn, SABB, and W .
Before proving UC security, we prove a series of useful lemmas. First, note
that the only randomness involved in ΠOnline is in the hiding of private inputs
and the generation of secret shares. Therefore, we first prove a lemma related
to the indistinguishability of secret shares and public reconstructions gener-
ated in the real world to those generated similar to how SABB generates them.
Consider an execution of the real world consisting ofZ, D, parties P1, . . . , Pn
running the protocol ΠOnline, n(n − 1) FAsync functionalities, FAtomic, and
FOffline. Let inputs be the set of input values that Z provides parties in
ΠOnline - for honest parties, explicitly, and for corrupt parties, implicitly by
directing them to send a message to FAtomic. Let hidden inputs be the set of
hidden inputs broadcast in FAtomic on line 6 of Figure A.2. Let offline shares
be the set of shares that adversarial parties have access to from FOffline. Let
factor polys be the set of polynomials that adversarial parties receive for hid-
den factors in Beaver multiplication, from lines 19-24 in Figure A.4. Let
output shares be the set of shares that adversarial parties receive from ΠOnline
in line 33 and 34 in Figure A.4. Let outputs be the set of outputs that parties
generated from ΠOnline and forwarded to Z.
Now we construct sets of secret shares that similar to those generated in
SABB. Let hidden inputs′ be a set of length |hidden inputs| consisting of ran-
dom values in Fp. Let offline shares
′ be a set of length |offline shares| consist-
ing of random values in Fp. Let factor polys
′ be a set of length |factor polys|
consisting of random t-degree polynomials in Fp. Now we prove the following
lemma:
Lemma 5. Consider the sets hidden inputs′, offline shares′, factor polys′, and
outputs generated as described above. Then, it is always possible to create a
set output shares′ consistent with hidden inputs′, offline shares′, factor polys′,
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and outputs. We also have that
(inputs, hidden inputs, offline shares, factor polys, output shares, outputs)
is indistinguishable from
(inputs, hidden inputs′, offline shares′, factor polys′, output shares′, outputs).
Proof. First, we note a few properties of the real-world protocol. By line 19
of Figure A.2, secret sharings used to hide inputs are used only once, and by
lines 10-15 of Figure A.1, FOffline guarantees that Beaver triples used in mul-
tiplications are only used once. This means that each piece of randomness
in the protocol is only used once. Additionally, we note that contracts are
all processed independently, as a new handler is created for every contract
in line 15 of Figure A.2. This means that, without loss of generality, we can
assume that all inputs are to the same contract.
Consider the number of points the adversary and environment learn. Since
we consider a setting of up to t corruptions, and by the definition of FOffline
in Figure A.1, we know that they learn at most t points for an input. In
particular, the t points the adversary and environment learn by combining
values from hidden inputs and offline shares is insufficient to constrain the ac-
tual input. We now argue that the adversary only learns up to t points of
the output of each linear combination and multiplication. For linear combi-
nations, since parties combine secret shares they already have, this directly
follows. For multiplication, as Beaver triples are only used once in our pro-
tocol, the adversary only learns t shares of the product because of Beaver
multiplication. In particular, since t shares is not enough to constrain the
actual product, and offline shares and factor polys are generated randomly in
the real world, the adversary cannot detect if points from offline shares′ and
polynomials from factor polys′ are used, instead of points from offline shares
and polynomials from factor polys.
It now immediately follows that output shares′ can be constructed. output shares
represents the shares of outputs from honest parties from line 33 of Figure
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A.4. Output shares of honest parties can be faked by doing the following: as
the adversary has up to t shares for the output, and we know the actual value
of the output from outputs, a t-degree polynomial can be constructed that
is consistent with these < t + 1 points. Then, simulated output shares for
honest parties are points directly from this polynomial. It is also immediate
that
(inputs, hidden inputs, offline shares, factor shares, output shares, outputs)
is indistinguishable from
(inputs, hidden inputs′, offline shares′, factor shares′, output shares′, outputs).
This is because, as seen above, the only constraint is that output shares′
must be consistent with outputs, and that holds from the definition of output shares′.
Note that the definition of the second set of shares above is how SABB
generates them in lines 4-14 of Figure A.7. This means that the shares and
public reconstructions generated by SABB are indistinguishable from those in
an actual execution of ΠOnline.
We now consider the following lemma, demonstrating that, in ΠOnline, all
state transitions in a contract will eventually be performed:
Lemma 6. Consider an execution of the real-world protocol ΠOnline. Con-
sider a contract in the protocol. We have that all honest parties will receive
the same state transitions in the same order from each contract. Addition-
ally, all honest parties will eventually resolve each of these transitions.
Proof. First, note that all parties eventually receive contract inputs from
FAtomic in the same order. By lines 7-29 of Figure A.2, all honest parties will
input values to contracts in the same order. Since contracts are required to
output state transitions in the same order if variables are defined in the same
order, we have that all honest parties will eventually receive the same state
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transitions in the same order from each contract.
There are three types of transitions to consider: linear combinations, mul-
tiplications, and outputs. We consider each of these in turn, showing that,
in all cases, all honest parties eventually resolve the transition:
• T is type LIN COMB: By lines 10-12 of Figure A.4, all honest parties
immediately resolve the transition.
• T is type MULT: In lines 19-21 of Figure A.4, each honest party sends
hidings of factors to every other party. Because of eventual code ex-
ecution, each of these messages is eventually delivered. In the worst
case, parties must wait for shares from all other honest parties for ro-
bust interpolation in lines 23 and 24. Because of eventual delivery, this
will eventually happen. Parties then resolve this transition in lines 26-
28. This means that each honest party will eventually resolve a MULT
transition.
• T is type OUTPUT: In line 33 of Figure A.4, each honest party sends
its share to every other party. Because of eventual delivery, these mes-
sages are all eventually delivered. In the worst case, interpolation of
the output on line 35 requires all honest shares - however, because all
honest shares are eventually delivered, the output will eventually be
interpolated.
We now consider the following lemma, describing W in the ideal world:
Lemma 7. Consider the ideal world consisting of Z, SABB, the dummy par-
ties D1 . . . Dn, W, and FABB. For every n > 0, at the nth activation of Z,
the runqueue in W is empty or the delay in W is non-zero.
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Proof. The proof of this is similar to the one for Lemma 3. The differences
are the following.
(1) References to specific line numbers of FABB and SABB change.
(2) Indefinite delay does not occur, because all outputs from FABB are ac-
counted for by the following:
• All inputs to ΠOnline are eventually delivered to all honest parties by the
definition of FAtomic and line 29 of Figure A.2. This handles outputs
from line 29 of FABB.
• All outputs are eventually delivered to all honest parties by Lemma 6.
This handles outputs from line 27 of FABB.
We now consider the following lemma, which is the analogue of Lemma
4, the only difference being computational indistinguishability rather than
perfect simulation.
Lemma 8. Consider the real world consisting of Z, D, the parties P1, . . . , Pn
running ΠOnline, n(n−1) FAsync functionalities, FOffline, FAtomic, andW. Con-
sider the ideal world consisting of Z, SABB, D1, . . . , Dn, FABB, and W. For
all k > 0, on the kth activation of Z, the following two statements hold:
(i) Let z0 denote the input on which Z is activated. Let z1, . . . , zk−1 denote
the outputs from Z to the real world, and let zd denote the last non-Pi
activation in z1, . . . , zk−1. The distribution on the steps performed in
the real world, on inputs z0, z1, . . . , zl, and the distribution of those per-
formed within SABB’s simulation in the ideal world are computationally
indistinguishable.
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(ii) The distribution on the messages activating Z in the real world is com-
putationally indistinguishable from the distribution on the messages ac-
tivating Z in the ideal world.
Proof. We prove this through mutual induction.
Let k = 1. Clearly, (i) and (ii) hold in this case.
Now, choose k > 1, and assume that (i) and (ii) hold for all k′ < k. By the
inductive hypothesis on (ii), we know that the transcript of Z is computa-
tionally indistinguishable in both worlds, up to activation k− 1. This means
that the distributions on the message written by Z and the ITM written
to by Z in both worlds are computationally indistinguishable for activation
k − 1. We now show that (i) holds for k by considering each ITM to which
Z could write a message at the end of activation k − 1:
• Z wrote to W in activation k − 1: Let us consider the ideal world. By
a combination of Lemma 7 and line 13 of W in Figure 3.2, S activates
SABB. We know by the inductive hypothesis on (i) that the distribu-
tion on the steps executed in the actual and simulated real worlds are
indistinguishable, up to the point of an activation of Pi. However, by
lines 5-6 of Figure A.5, SABB retrieves leaks from FABB and simulates
inputs in the simulated real world with lines 31 and 33 of Figure A.5.
This makes the distribution on the steps indistinguishable to the point
of the ADVANCE message. By line 17 of Figure A.5, SABB simulates
the ADVANCE message internally, as would happen in the real world.
When S receives an output from the simulated real world and generates
an output for Z the simulated real world will have an indistinguishable
distribution on the steps executed within it to those steps executed in
the actual real world. Thus, (i) will hold for k.
• Z wrote to S/A in activation k − 1: We know by the inductive hy-
pothesis on (i) that the distribution on the steps executed in the actual
and simulated real worlds are indistinguishable, up to the point of an
activation of Pi. However, by lines 5-6 of Figure A.5, SABB retrieves
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leaks from FABB and simulates inputs in the simulated real world with
lines 31 and 33 of Figure A.5. This makes the distribution on the steps
indistinguishable to the point of the adversary receiving a message. By
lines 9 and 11 of Figure A.5, SABB forwards these messages to the sim-
ulated real world, as would happen in the real world. When S receives
an output from the simulated real world and generates an output for
Z the simulated real world will have an indistinguishable distribution
on the steps executed within it to those steps executed in the actual
real world. Thus, (i) will hold for k.
• Z wrote to Di/Pi in activation k−1: The two distributions being com-
pared do not change. (i) thus holds for k.
Since (i) holds for k in all cases shown above, (i) holds for k. We now show
that (ii) holds for k as well.
As argued earlier, the distributions on the message written by Z and the
ITM written to by Z in both worlds are computationally indistinguishable
for activation k− 1. This means that the distribution of zREALk−1 , the message
written by Z in the real world is indistinguishable from the distribution of
zIDEALk−1 , the message written by Z in the ideal world. We, therefore, consider
each ITM to which Z could write a message in activation k − 1:
• Z wrote to Di/Pi in activation k − 1: In the real world, Pi passes the
input to FAtomic in line 4 of Figure A.2. After a codeblock is appended
toW , the activation ends with no outgoing message. In the ideal world,
Di passes the input to FABB. In line 6 of 5.1, FABB appends a code-
block toW and the activation ends with no outgoing message. In both
worlds, as there is no outgoing message, Z is automatically invoked
with no incoming message, and (ii) holds for k.
• Z wrote to another tape in activation k − 1: Since (i) holds for k and
zk−1 is not an activation of Di/Pi, we know that the distribution of the
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steps performed in the real and simulated real worlds are computation-
ally indistinguishable. Z may receive an output from two tapes in the
real world: the tapes of honest parties and from D. We show that in
both cases, SABB causes indistinguishable outputs in the ideal world:
– Z receives an output from D: SABB receives an output from its
internal simulation by (i). SABB causes a similar output to hap-
pen in the ideal world through line 23 in Figure A.5. The function
adv handler in Figure A.7 passes all messages to corrupt contract
handlers in line 3 of A.7. These are used to calculate the view of
corrupt parties and the values they would have for output shares.
When simulated honest parties generate outputs, SABB uses these
calculated output shares in lines 5-14 of Figure A.7 to simulate
output shares for honest parties. These are then forwarded to Z
in line 15. By Lemma 5, any shares contained within the output
message, including secret shares included in messages from the
simulated FAtomic functionality, the simulated FOffline functional-
ity, or simulated honest parties, are indistinguishable from those
in the real world. This means that the message from SABB that
activates Z is indistinguishable from the one that D sends Z in
the real world. Thus, (ii) holds for k.
– Z receives an output from an honest Pi: SABB receives an output
from a simulated Pi by (i). SABB causes a similar output to hap-
pen in the ideal world through line 21 in Figure A.5, which calls
the party handler function defined in Figure A.6. We now explain
how it works by discussing various goals of this function.
Note that ΠOnline relies on FAtomic for underlying consensus. In
FAtomic, as seen in line 1 of Figure 3.7, a blockchain is stored inter-
nally. FABB also stores a blockchain internally on line 1 of Figure
5.1. The first goal of SABB is to set these blockchains equal -
more specifically, as simulated honest parties output definitions
of inputs and contracts that are not already included in FABB’s
BC, SABB must instruct FABB to include them. SABB does this
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through lines 5-16 and lines 17-26 of Figure A.6. These inputs
and contracts might have originally been input to FABB by honest
parties. If so, FABB would already have received those inputs and
SABB would have already retrieved leaks related to them. SABB
merely needs to instruct FABB to include those inputs in its in-
ternal blockchain, and SABB does with lines 7, 16, 19, and 31 of
Figure A.6. If, instead, these are inputs and contracts from origi-
nally input to the simulated protocol by adversarial parties, SABB
must instruct dummy adversarial parties to send these to FABB
first. This happens in lines 8-11 and 22-26 of Figure A.6.
The second goal of SABB is to schedule input and contract defi-
nition messages for delivery to the dummy Di in the ideal world.
These are the definition messages in FABB on line 29 of Figure 5.1.
SABB does this on lines 32-33 of Figure A.6.
The third goal of SABB is to schedule outputs from contracts for
delivery to the dummy Di in the ideal world. These are outputs
from contracts in FABB in line 27 of Figure 5.1. SABB does this
on lines 35-36 of Figure A.6. We quickly note that the outputs
in the real world and ideal functionality will be indistinguishable,
because line 11 of FABB in Figure 5.1 performs transitions one-by-
one in the same order as does ContractHandler in ΠOnline. Since
the same transitions are performed, the output from FABB will be
the same as what is publicly reconstructed in ΠOnline.
Because of the delivery mechanism used in FABB in lines 31-33 of
Figure 5.1, SABB instructs delivery of all messages appended above
through lines 37-38 of Figure A.6. Once SABB instructs delivery,
the message that activates Z in the ideal world will be indistin-
guishable from that of the real world. Therefore, (ii) holds for k.
Thus, in all cases, (ii) holds for k. Since we have shown that (i) and (ii) hold
for k, we have that the lemma holds for all k.
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We now give a proof of UC-security, which follows directly from Lemma
8, by means of the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Protocol ΠOnline securely realizes FABB in the (FAtomic, FOffline,
Fn(n−1)Async )-hybrid model, in the presence of a static adversary corrupting up to
t parties for t < n
3
Proof. By (ii) of Lemma 8, we have that the transcripts of Z in both worlds
are computationally indistinguishable. But this implies that
{EXECpi,D,W,ZREAL (z)}z∈{0,1}∗
c≡ {EXECF ,S,W,ZIDEAL (z)}z∈{0,1}∗
must hold. This is because the transcript represents the Z’s entire view of
the execution - if these probability ensembles were not indistinguishable, the
transcripts of both worlds could be distinguished based on the distribution
of the output bit, contradicting Lemma 8. Thus, UC security holds for
FABB.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis provides an approach to designing more modular asynchronous
protocols in the universal composability framework by providing a wrapper
for eventual code execution. This simplifies protocol design by replacing
the standard fetch mechanism for eventual delay from the literature with a
new keyword eventually. We argue that asynchronous protocols defined this
keyword are clearer to define and easier to analyze, by giving examples of
functionalities in both approaches. We also use this keyword to prove the
security of Bracha’s reliable broadcast protocol. We finally define an asyn-
chronous arithmetic black box for MPC in what we call the Smart Contract
Model of MPC, and provide a UC-realization of it.
There are several promising directions for future work:
- We defined our eventual code execution wrapper by leveraging the im-
port approach to polynomial-bounded execution. However, we do not
actually use import in defining our protocols or functionalities. Under-
standing import and how it can be used in ITM definitions more deeply
is essential to increasing usability of the UC framework.
- We constructed an asynchronous arithmetic black box as a UC-idealization
of asynchronous, robust MPC. Future work would build more compli-
cated MPC protocols using our ABB as a building block.
41
APPENDIX A
UC MODELS FOR ABB
FOffline
On input RAND from Pi:1
Generate random t-degree polynomial φr(·)2
Generate unique label for φr(·), and store φr(·) under (Pi, label)3
Send (φr(0), label) to Pi4
On input (RAND, (Pj, label)) from Pi:5
if (Pj, label) is not stored:6
Generate new random t-degree polynomial φr(·) stored under
(Pj, label)
7
8
if (Pj, label) is stored: send φr(i) to Pi9
On input (TRIPLE, action) to Pi:10
if (TRIPLE, action) was not previously input:11
Generate t-degree random polynomials φa(·), φb(·), φab(·) subject
to φa(0) · φb(0) = φab(0)
12
13
Store these three polynomials under the label action14
Send (φa(i), φb(i), φab(i)), stored under the label action, to Pi15
Figure A.1: Offline phase functionality
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ΠOnline
Initialize BC← ∅, handlers← ∅, buffer← ∅1
On input (INPUT, x, contract id) from Z:2
Send rand to FOffline and receive (r, label) in response3
Input (INPUT, x− r, label, contract id) to FAtomic4
On input (CONTRACT, C) from Z:5
Input (CONTRACT, C) to FAtomic6
On input BC′ from FAtomic:7
if |BC| ≥ |BC′|: return8
msgs← ∅9
for pos in [|BC|+ 1, |BC′|]:10
input← BC′[pos]11
if input is of form ((CONTRACT, C),Pj):12
k ← number of contracts in BC′[1 : pos− 1]13
Label C with contract id = k + 114
handlers[contract id]← new contract handler for C15
Pop all elements in buffer for C and input to handlers[contract id]16
Append (CONTRACT, C, contract id, pos) to msgs17
if input is of form ((INPUT, y, label, contract id),Pj):18
If (Pj, label) was previously in BC
′: continue19
Send (LABEL, (Pj, label)) to FOffline and receive [[r]]it20
k ← number of inputs by Pj in BC′[1 : pos− 1]21
[[Pj
k+1]]it ← y + [[r]]it22
C ← contract labeled with contract id in BC′[1 : pos− 1]23
If C 6= ⊥:24
Input (Pj, [[Pj
k+1]]it) to handlers[contract id]25
Append (INPUT, contract id, pos) to msgs26
BC← BC′27
msgs.extend(PerformTransitions())28
Output msgs if |msgs| > 029
On input msg from F (Pj,Pi)async :30
msgs← PerformTransitions(Pj,msg)31
Output msgs if |msgs| > 032
PerformTransitions():33
msgs← ∅34
For handler in handlers: msgs.extend(handler.do actions())35
Return msgs36
PerformTransitions(Pi,msg):37
contract id← contract id from msg38
If contract id in handlers: input (Pi,msg) to handlers[contract id]39
Else: Append (Pi,msg) to buffer40
Return PerformTransitions()41
Figure A.2: Protocol for the online phase
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ContractHandler(C, id)
Initialize inputs ← ∅, msgs ← ∅, current action ← ⊥, count ← 0,
pid← id of current party
1
2
input msg((Pi, msg))3
If (Pi, msg) is well-formed and not in msgs, append to msgs4
Return do actions()5
input val((Pi, share))6
Append (Pi, share) to inputs7
Return do actions()8
Figure A.3: Initialization and inputs for ContractHandler
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ContractHandler(C, id) (actions)
do actions():1
If current action = ⊥:2
While current action = ⊥:3
Pop input from queue and input→ C4
current action← C.get5
Return ∅ if current action = ⊥6
count← count + 17
(type, vars)← current action8
If type is of LIN COMB:9
(coeffs=[a0, . . . , an], in vals=[1, [[x1]]
i
t, . . . , [[xn]]
i
t], sum label)← vars10
(sum label, coeffs · in vals)→ C11
Set current action = ⊥ and return do actions()12
If type is of MULT:13
([[x]]it, [[y]]
i
t, prod label)← vars14
If shares have not yet been broadcast:15
Send (TRIPLE, (id, count, prod label)) to FOffline16
Receive ([[a]]it, [[b]]
i
t, [[ab]]
i
t) from FOffline17
Compute [[x− a]]it ← [[x]]it − [[a]]it and [[y − b]]it ← [[y]]it − [[b]]it18
factor1 msg← (MULT, count, 1, [[x− a]]it)19
factor2 msg← (MULT, count, 2, [[y − b]]it)20
For each Pi, send factor1 msg and factor2 msg to Pi21
Append (pid, factor1 msg) and (pid, factor2 msg) to msgs22
x− a← Robust-Interpolate(shares of x− a from msgs)23
y − b← Robust-Interpolate(shares of y − b from msgs)24
If x− a 6= ⊥ and y − b 6= ⊥:25
[[xy]]it = (x− a)(y − b) + [[b]]it(x− a) + [[a]]it(y − b) + [[ab]]it26
(outvar, [[xy]]it)→ C27
Set current action = ⊥ and return do actions()28
Else: Return ∅29
If type is of OUTPUT:30
(out label, [[x]]it)← C31
If shares have not yet been broadcast:32
For each Pi, send (OUTPUT, (out label, count), [[x]]
i
t) to Pi33
Append (pid, (OUTPUT, (out label, count), [[x]]it)) to msgs34
x← Robust-Interpolate(shares of x from msgs)35
If x 6= ⊥:36
(OUTPUT, out label)→ C37
Set current action = ⊥38
Return [(OUTPUT, (id, out label), x)] + do actions()39
Else: Return ∅40
Figure A.4: do actions() in ContractHandler
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SABB
Simulate parties P′1, . . . ,P
′
n running protocol Π
′
online, n(n− 1) F ′async
point-to-point channels, F ′atomic, F ′offline, dummy adversary D′, and
wrapper W ′
1
2
3
idealqueue← ∅, idealdelay← 0, outputs← ∅, corrupthandlers← ∅4
On every activation, except for activations in the middle of a subrou-
tine: Execute get leaks()
5
6
On input (WRITE, Pi, msg) from Z:7
If Pi is corrupt:8
Send message to D′, instructing D′ to forward msg to P′i9
On input (WRITE, W , msg) from Z:10
Send msg to W ′11
On input (ADVANCE,) from W :12
delay← max(delay − 1, 0)13
If delay = 0 and runqueue is not empty:14
Send (DELAY, 1), 1 t to W and receive (OK, ) back from W15
delay← 116
Send (ADVANCE,), 1 t to W ′17
On input (LEAKS, leaks) from W :18
Execute parse leaks(leaks)19
On input (OUTPUTS, partyoutputs) from Pi’:20
Execute party handler(partyoutputs,Pi
′)21
On input msg from D′:22
Execute adv handler(msg)23
get leaks():24
Send (READ, ) to W and pass output to parse leaks25
parse leaks(leaks):26
For leak in leaks:27
If leak is an eventual code execution leak:28
Append leak to idealqueue29
If leak is about an value input to FABB from an honest Pi:30
Direct the simulated party Pi’ to input 0 to Π
′
online31
If leak is about an honest Pi creating contract C:32
Direct the simulated party Pi’ to add C to Π′online33
Else if leak is outputs from FABB:34
outputs′ ← outputs included in leak35
If |outputs′ > outputs|: outputs← outputs′36
Figure A.5: Simulator for ABB
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SABB (continued)
party handler(partyoutputs,Pi
′):1
For output in partyoutputs:2
If output is related to defining a contract or a variable:3
pos← position in BC according to the output message4
If pos = |BC| and output is related to defining a contract:5
C ← contract being created according to output6
queue pos← position in idealqueue for creating C7
If queue pos = ⊥:8
Get sender Pj of C according to output9
Direct Pj to input C to FABB - Pj will be corrupt10
get leaks()11
queue pos← position in idealqueue12
For each corrupt Pi:13
Create ContractHandler for C14
Append handler to corrupthandlers15
execute(queue pos)16
If pos = |BC| and output is related to defining a variable:17
id,Pj ← contract id and input sender according to output18
queue pos← position in idealqueue for (id,Pj)19
tx← F ′Atomic.BC[pos] (note F ′Atomic is in SABB’s memory)20
(x− r), label← from inside tx21
If queue pos = ⊥:22
r← from inside F ′Offline, using key label23
Direct Pj to input x, id to FABB24
get leaks()25
queue pos← position in idealqueue26
For each corrupt Pj:27
Get [[r]]jt from inside FOffline using key label28
Compute [[x]]jt ← (x− r) + [[r]]jt29
Input [[x]]jt to appropriate corrupt contract handler30
execute(queue pos)31
queue pos← position in idealqueue for GenOutputs(pos) for Pi32
execute(queue pos)33
Else if output related to producing an output:34
queue pos← position in idealqueue for delivering output to Pi35
execute(queue pos)36
queue pos← position in idealqueue for delivering all outputs to Pi37
Pop idealqueue[queue pos] and send EXECUTE, queue pos to W38
execute(queue pos):39
Pop idealqueue[queue pos] and send EXECUTE, queue pos to W40
On receipt (OK,), get leaks()41
Figure A.6: Handler for outputs from simulated parties
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SABB (continued)
adv handler(msg):1
If msg is from F ′Async and is not an share of an output:2
Pass msg to appropriate corrupt contract handler3
If msg is from F ′Async and is a share of an output:4
If a polynomial has been defined for the output referenced in msg:5
Replace the share in msg with the corresponding share from the
generated polynomial
6
7
If a polynomial has not been generated:8
Input messages from the simulated runqueue until all simulated
corrupt handlers for this contract produce an output share.
9
10
Generate and store a t-degree polynomial consistent with cor-
rupt output shares and the actual output value
11
12
Replace the share in msg with the corresponding share from the
generated polynomial
13
14
Forward msg to Z15
Corrupt ContractHandlers:16
These are the same ContractHandlers from ΠOnline, except that:17
Any messaged generated for FOffline are forwarded to D′, directing
it to direct the simulated corrupt party to send the message to the
simulated F ′Offline. Outputs are routed into ContractHandler
18
19
20
Any messages generated for FAsync are suppressed. Any output
shares generated are stored to later generate consistent polynomi-
als and simulated honest output shares.
21
22
23
Figure A.7: Handler for simulated adversary messages and view of corrupt
parties
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